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124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004)
I. Facts
In October of 1986 a Texas jury convicted Robert Tennard of capital
murder, finding that the petitioner and two accomplices killed two of Tennard's
neighbors.' During closing arguments at the penalty phase, defense counsel
relied upon evidence that Tennard was a gullible person with an I.Q. of only 67.2
The prosecution argued that Tennard's I.Q. was irrelevant, and the jury
sentenced petitioner to death upon a finding of both deliberateness and future
dangerousness.3  After an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner sought
postconviction relief.4 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that
Tennard's I.Q. score did not establish mental retardation, and even if it did,
petitioner would still not have been entitled to relief
In Tennard's subsequent request for federal habeas relief, he claimed that
the sentencing instructions that guided the jury were inadequate because the two
special issues presented to the jury did not allow the sentencer to consider and
give effect to Tennard's mitigating evidence of gullibility and a low I.Q.6 The
district court denied the petition, finding both that a low I.Q. score did not
establish mental retardation and also that the jury had ample opportunity to
consider the mitigating significance of the low score.7 The district court then
denied petitioner a certificate of appealability ("COA").8
1. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2565 (2004).
2. Id at 2566. At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of a previous rape
conviction on Tennard's record. Id The rape victim testified that she had escaped captivity by
exiting through a bathroom window after telling Tennard that she would not attempt to flee if she
were allowed to bathe. Id
3. Id; see TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (requiring the
submission to the jury of the two special issues of deliberateness and future dangerousness).
4. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2566.
5. Id at 2567; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,319-28 (1989). In Peng, the Supreme Court
concluded that because the jury was not informed that it could consider and give effect to the
defendant's evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating factor, the imposition of a death sentence
offended the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pen, 492 U.S. at 328. The Supreme Court had
previously found that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not
be precluded from considering, as a miigafingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
6. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2566-68.
7. Id at 2568.
8. Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court's conclusion.' Tennard's claim that the jury was unable to give
mitigating effect to evidence presented because instructions that limited the jury's
consideration to the two special issues of deliberateness and future
dangerousness were identical to those found unconstitutional in a 1989 case,
Peny v. Lynaugh.1 In applying its own two-step "constitutional relevance" test
for such Penry claims, the Fifth Circuit examined whether the petitioner produced
evidence of a "uniquely severe permanent handicap with which the defendant
was burdened through no fault of his own" and whether the petitioner presented
evidence that " 'the criminal act was attributable to this severe permanent
condition.' "" The court first held that evidence of a low I.Q. score did not
amount to a "uniquely severe" condition and that the defense did not produce
evidence of mental retardation, as opposed to simply a low I.Q. score.'12 Second,
the Fifth Circuit held that had the evidence proved that Tennard was mentally
retarded, the defense still failed to prove that the crime itself was a result of the
low I.Q. score. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted Tennard's petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light ofAtkins v. Virginia. 4 After considering the substantive
Atkins claim, the Fifth Circuit reinstated its prior decision because petitioner did
not claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibited his execution as a mentally
retarded person.'5 Again, the Supreme Court granted Tennard's petition for writ
of certiorari.'6
HI. Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. 7 The Court
found: (1) that evidence is relevant as mitigating evidence in capital cases if it "is
of such a character that it 'might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death' ";
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2567; see Peny, 492 U.S. at 319-28 (finding that "the jury must be allowed to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense").




14. Id; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321(2002) (holding that the execution of mentally
retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
15. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2568; see Tennard v. Cockrell, 317 F.3d 476, 477 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that because Tennard did not raise an Eighth Amendment issue, the claim was not
properly before the Fifth Circuit).
16. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2568.
17. Id at 2573.
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and (2) that evidence of a low I.Q. is relevant mitigating evidence in capital cases,
regardless of whether the defendant established a nexus between his mental
capacity and the crime.'8 Ultimately, the Court found that Tennard was entitled
to a COA on his assertion that the jury instructions of the Texas capital
sentencing scheme denied him the opportunity to have the jury consider and give
mitigating effect to his low I.Q.'9
III. Analysis
A. Legal Background
In 1978 the Supreme Court decided Locket v. Ohio,0° in which the petitioner
argued that the Ohio death penalty statute was unconstitutional for its failure to
provide the sentencing judge an opportunity to consider any but a narrow range
of mitigating circumstances. 2' The Court sustained Lockett's challenge, holding
that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."-" The Court added
that "an individualized decision is essential in capital cases" because a death
sentence is such an extreme penalty without the corrective mechanisms that are
available with other forms of punishment.
23
The Court subsequently applied the Lockett rule to Texas's death penalty
statute in Peny.24 Texas statutory law limited the sentencing jury to consideration
of specific special issues: whether the commission of the crime was deliberate
and whether the defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society.' The jury
then was to "return a special verdict of 'yes' or 'no' on each issue submitted."26
If the jury answered "yes" to each of the special issues, the court was required to
18. Id. at 2571-72 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
19. Id. at 2572-73.
20. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
21. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597.
22. Id at 604.
23. Id at 605.
24. Peny, 492 U.S. at 318.
25. See TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (requiring a jury
upon instruction to consider both "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased would constitute a continuing threat to society" and also "whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society").
26. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(c).
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sentence the defendant to death. Penry argued that his evidence of mental
retardation and childhood abuse was directly relevant to his moral culpability and
that the Texas death penalty statute was unconstitutional for its failure to inform
the jury that such evidence could be given mitigating effect.28 The Supreme
Court agreed with Penry and concluded that "the jury must be allowed to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character
or record or the circumstances of the offense."2 9
Although Texas amended its sentencing statute to accommodate the prob-
lem identified in Peny, a slew of pre-Peny cases continued to work their way
through the Texas state and federal courts. As these cases reached the Fifth
Circuit, that court developed its own highly restrictive interpretation of
"constitutional relevance" under Peny.'° According to the Fifth Circuit, "[t]o
grant relief on a Peny claim, we must determine (1) that the proffered evidence
was constitutionall relevant mitigating evidence, and, if so, (2) that the proffered
evidence was beyond the 'effective reach' of the jurors."'" The court found
evidence constitutionally relevant if it showed "(1) a 'uniquely severe permanent
handicap [ I with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his
own,'. . . and (2) that the criminal act was attributable to this severe permanent
condition.' 2 Although no precedent existed for the "constitutional relevance"
test, the Fifth Circuit consistently relied upon its new gloss on Peng, claims for
the next ten years.3'
B. Entitlement to a COA and Habeas Review
The Supreme Court first addressed the standards for issuing a COA and for
granting federal habeas relief.'4 The pertinent federal habeas statute provides that
"[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a
27. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(e).
28. Pengy, 492 U.S. at 320-22.
29. Id at 327-28.
30. See Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the petitioner's
"reliance on his personality disorder, his learning disability, and his troubled childhood as mitigation
in support of his Pengy claim, [was] misplaced").
31. Id (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372 (1993)).
32. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457,460-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d
1009, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)).
33. See, e.g., Bigby v. Cockrell, 340 F.3d 259, 275 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that evidence of a
petitioner's schizophrenia was constitutionally mitigating evidence); Robertson v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d
243, 253 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that without constitutionally mitigating evidence, a
supplemental jury instruction that failed to cure the defective Texas statutory instructions did not
constitute error); Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661,680-81 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying the constitution-
ally relevant prong of a two-part test to determine if evidence requires a special instruction).
34. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2569.
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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."3 Furthermore, in
Slack v. McDaniel,36 the Court held that the "petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong."
37
A federal court may only grant federal habeas relief on a claim that has been
decided on the merits by a state court if "the state court adjudication 'resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.' "38 The Court confirmed that Tennard properly preserved his
claim for habeas review because defense counsel had unsuccessfully raised the
Peny claim in a pretrial motion and because the state courts had decided the issue
on the merits.
39
C. The Fiftb Circuit's COA Determination
Both 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Slack provide clear standards for issuance
of a COA.' However, because the Fifth Circuit applied its independent
"constitutional relevance" screening test when evaluating Peny claims, the
petitioner was inappropriately required to hurdle an additional obstacle to "
'demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.' ,141 Consequently, because
Tennard failed to produce evidence that the crime was attributable to his low
I.Q., the appellate court concluded that he did not have an meritorious Peny
claim.42 The Supreme Court, however, determined that the Fifth Circuit's
"constitutional relevance" test was inappropriate because the Court had never
"screened mitigating evidence . . . before considering whether the jury
instructions comported with the Eighth Amendment."
'4 3
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's restrictive test, "the 'meaning of relevance is
no different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).
36. 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
37. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
38. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2569 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)); see 28 U.S.C.
2254(d)(1) (limiting federal courts' authority to issue writs of habeas corpus regarding state court
adjudications; part of AEDPA).
39. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2569.
40. Id. at 2569-70.
41. Id. (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484); see id at 2568 (stating that defendant must present
evidence of both a "uniquely severe permanent handicap" and also that the crime was "attributable
to this severe permanent condition").




sentencing proceeding' than in any other context."' Evidence is relevant if it has
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. '45  Therefore, it follows that " '[rjelevant mitigating
evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or
circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating
value.' "' If evidence could persuade a reasonable jurist to institute a sentence
less than death, a state cannot preclude the sentencer from considering it.47
One of the Court's primary concerns with the Fifth Circuit's screening test
was that it effectively excluded all good-character evidence because a defendant's
positive attributes can be considered neither handicaps nor explanations for a
crime.48  Such an exclusion directly contradicted the principle that "good-
character evidence can be evidence that . . . 'may not be excluded from the
sentencer's consideration.' "' For example, although a defendant's behavior
while incarcerated is unrelated to the defendant's guilt of capital murder, the
Court held in Skipperthat" 'a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and
peaceful adjustment to life in prison is ... by its nature relevant to the sentencing
determination.' ,s The Fifth Circuit's test, however, incorrectly bars such
evidence as constitutionally irrelevant.5' Instead, the Supreme Court concluded
that "the question is simply whether the evidence is of such a character that it
'might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.' 2
The Supreme Court further held that the Fifth Circuit should not have
declined Tennard's Peny claim solely because Tennard did not produce evidence
that the crime was a result of his low I.Q.53 Citing Atkins, the Court stated that
"impaired intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating."'  Because the Court
in Atkins did not require a nexus between petitioner's mental retardation and the
44. Id. (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)).
45. FED. R. EvID. 401.
46. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2570 (quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 440).
47. Id.; see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,822 (1991) (stating that "a State cannot preclude
the sentencer from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence' that the defendant proffers in
support of a sentence less than death").
48. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2570.
49. Id. (quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5).
50. Id at 2570-71 (quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7).
51. Id. at 2571.
52. Id. (quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5) (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2571; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (finding that "today our society
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal").
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crime, the Court in Tennard refused to require such a connection to allow the
introduction of a low I.Q. as mitigating evidence during sentencing.
5 5
D. Issuance of a COA
In discussing the appropriate test for issuing a COA, the Court posed the
appropriate inquiry: "has Tennard 'demonstrate[d] that reasonable jurists would
find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong'? ,56 Because a low I.Q. demonstrated Tennard's reduced mental capacity,
a reasonable jurist could have found it relevant mitigating evidence that weighed
in favor of a sentence other than death." The Supreme Court also found that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied Peny in rejecting Tennard's Pengy
claim. 58 Specifically, both the evidence and comments from the prosecution
suggested that the jury was misled to believe that Tennard's low I.Q. was relevant
only as an aggravating factor tending to prove petitioner's future dangerousness.59
As a result, a reasonable jurist could find that mitigating significance of the
evidence had been erroneously excluded from the jury's decision-making.6
IV. Application in Virginia
Virginia capital defendants may continue to rely on federal statute and Slack
as the guiding principles for issuing a COA. Defendants must demonstrate the
"denial of a constitutional right" and that a reasonable jurist would find the lower
court's "assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong."'" Habeas
petitioners will not be required to overcome additional obstacles, such as the
Fifth Circuit's "constitutional relevance" gloss on Peny claims, in order to obtain
a COA.62
Tennard establishes that a heightened relevance standard for mitigating
evidence is contrary to Supreme Court precedent and therefore invalid. There
is no distinction between the relevance standard for mitigating evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial and the general evidentiary standard.63
55. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572.




60. Id at 2572-73.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000) (stating that a COA "may issue... only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"); Slack, 529 U.S. at 484
(holding that "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong").
62. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572.
63. Id at 2570. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
2004]
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Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 provides in part that "evidence may be
presented as to any matter which the court deems relevant to sentence. '
Tennard establishes that state courts must deem evidence relevant if it passes the
minimal relevance requirements such as those contained in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and attorneys should object to the exclusion of any relevant mitigating
evidence during the sentencing proceeding of a capital trial, or to jury instructions
that obstruct the jury's ability to consider such evidence.6'
In light of Penry and Atkins, Tennard makes it clear that evidence of a low
I.Q. score is appropriate mitigating evidence that can be used in a capital
sentencing proceeding. However, because Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B)
already states in a non-exhaustive list that "the subaverage intellectual functioning
of the defendant" may serve as mitigating evidence, Tennard does not represent
a change in Virginia capital defense law.66 Instead, capital defense attorneys
should continue to take the appropriate steps to protect a client that could
potentially be found mentally retarded under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1.1.67 If a defendant is found not to be mentally retarded at trial and the
death penalty is not barred under Atkins, an impaired mental capacity such as
Tennard's still constitutes mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial.68
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court confirmed that 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Slack continue to
be the controlling authorities for the issuing of a COA.69 Tennardalso established
that defendants must meet only a bare relevance standard for introducing
mitigating evidence, and any additional requirements violate Supreme Court
precedent.7" The TennardCourt restated its position that evidence of an impaired
mental capacity is inherently mitigating for use in a capital sentencing
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004).
65. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (stating that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B).
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Michie 2004) (listing procedures for determining
whether a defendant is mentally retarded). For a complete discussion and analysis of Atkins, see
generaly Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 117 (2002) (analyzing Atkins v. Virginia,
122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)).
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (stating that "the subaverage intellectual functioning
of the defendant" may be used as mitigating evidence).
69. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2569.
70. Id. at 2570.
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proceeding." Although Tennard did not affect Virginia law, the case served to
reinforce the current law regarding general mitigating evidence, the use of
subaverage intellectual capacity as mitigating evidence, and the principles for
issuing a COA.7 2
For years, the Fifth Circuit dismissed numerous claims for their failure to'
pass its unique and inappropriate gloss on Pengy, and the Supreme Court
continued to deny certiorari.73 In late 2003, however, the unflagging efforts of
many attorneys for condemned Texas prisoners came to fruition when the Court
granted certiorari to examine and ultimately reject the Fifth Circuit's
"constitutional relevance" test.74 Tennard serves as a compelling reminder of the
importance of perseverance in capital defense.
Mark J. Goldsmith
71. Id. at 2571.
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004) (stating that "the subaverage intellec-
tual functioning of the defendant" may be used as mitigating evidence).
73. See, e.g., Robertson, 325 F.3d at 253 (rejecting a nexus between evidence of child abuse and
the defendant's criminal behavior), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 979 (2003);Jones v.Johnson, 171 F.3d 270,
276 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a nexus between evidence of a very low I.Q. and the defendant's
criminal behavior), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1059 (1999); Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir.
1995) (rejecting a nexus between paranoid schizophrenia, violent paraphilia, and child abuse and the
defendant's criminal behavior), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 992 (1995); Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213, 223
(5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a nexus between mental illness and the defendant's criminal behavior), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1108 (1995); Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486,489-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a nexus
between child abuse and a very low I.Q. and the defendant's criminal behavior), cer. denied, 513 U.S.
1086 (1995); Madden, 18 F.3d at 307-08 (rejecting a nexus between avoidant personality disorder,
organic brain impairment, and child abuse and the defendant's criminal behavior), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1156 (1995); Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a nexus between
head trauma and troubled childhood and the defendant's criminal behavior), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1057 (1993).
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